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This paper explores the effects of high skilled immigration to a host country with unionized 
low skilled labor and an unemployment insurance scheme. We show that such immigration 
can create a negative immigration surplus due to adverse effects on low skilled employment, 
provided that fiscal redistribution is not too intense and the elasticity between high and low 
skilled labor is high as empirical evidence suggests. 
JEL Code: F22, J5, H53, J61, J65. 

















I would like to thank CES Munich for the very generous hospitality and support during my 
visit. I. Introduction
While the impact of the international mobility of the highly skilled on sending
countries is disputed continuously (Bhagwati & Hamada, 1974; Mountford, 1997;
Haupt & Janeba, 2008), positive eﬀects on receiving countries are taken more or
less for granted. High skilled immigrants are most welcomed; not only because of
their ﬁscal contributions, but also because of the expected creation of employment
in other, in particular distorted, labor market segments (OECD, 2002, Chiswick,
2007).1
Somewhat surprisingly, the interaction between high skilled immigration and dis-
tortions in other labor market segments has received little investigation hitherto.
The present paper builds a simple model addressing the question how high skilled
immigration aﬀects a host economy with low skilled unemployment. Featuring some
fundamental characteristics of European labor markets, unemployment results from
the existence of trade unions and an unemployment insurance scheme.
Within this framework, we show that high skilled immigration is not necessarily
beneﬁcial, but can indeed impose a burden on the aggregate income of the native
population. This loss is based on the empirically corroborated fact that high and
low skilled labor are close, albeit imperfect substitutes in the production process
(Johnson, 1997; Card & Lemieux, 2001). With this property, we ﬁnd that a higher
number of high skilled workers reduces total low skilled employment as low skilled
labor demand, determining unions’ wage markup, becomes less elastic. This rise
in unemployment is even reinforced by additional ﬁscal redistribution exerted by
the high skilled. The resulting loss in aggregate native gross income dominates the
direct ﬁscal contributions by the high skilled when ﬁscal redistribution is not too
high.
To the best of our knowledge, these insights are novel to the literature. The only
other study exhibiting negative eﬀects of high skilled immigrants we are aware of is
Michael (2006). However, that result is based on a quite diﬀerent mechanism. In a
1 However, the materialization of these virtues hinges on the high skilled really coming to the
respective country which obviously depends on its economic appeal. The international compe-
tition for the high skilled is therefore expected to reduce equilibrium redistribution and hence
ﬁscal eﬀects in the receiving countries as well (Wildasin, 2000; Poutvaara, 2000; Andersson &
Konrad, 2003). This adjustment, which would render the above-mentioned employment aspect
even more relevant, is not our concern here. Rather, we investigate how high skilled immigration
operates on a country which is appealing enough to attract these people.- Native Welfare Losses from High Skilled Immigration - 2
full employment setting, Michael (2006) shows that the admittance of high skilled
immigrants can trigger additional low skilled immigration on such a scale that the
positive ﬁscal eﬀects of the former group are dominated by the negative ﬁscal eﬀects
of the latter. Our result is however not based on these ﬁscal, but on the employment
consequences instead.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II derives the labor market equilibrium of
the host economy. Section III addresses the eﬀects of high skilled immigration on the
labor market and the overall position of natives. Section IV oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
II. The Host Economy
Consider an economy where competitive ﬁrms produce the output with the inputs
high and low skilled labor H and L according to a CES production function:
Y = A[αH
ρ + (1 − α)L
ρ]
1/ρ , (1)
where ρ > 0, which is the empirically more relevant case of gross substitutability of
skills (Johnson, 1997; Card & Lemieux, 2001).
The native population comprises high and low skilled workers in amounts NH and
NL, respectively. The number of high skilled immigrants is MH. The labor market
for the high skilled is perfectly competitive, ensuring full employment for these
people by full ﬂexibility of the wage wH. Hence, the following results are not based
on some malfunctioning in this labor market segment.
The low skilled labor market, however, is distorted. The low skilled wage wL is
determined by a standard monopoly union model (Layard et al., 1991), where unions
act at the ﬁrm level in order to maximize a weighted surplus of members’ per capita
net income and employment L relative to the reference situation. As both unions
and ﬁrms are small relative to the economy, this reference situation is characterized
by full lay-oﬀ with all members receiving an unemployment beneﬁt b. Letting τ
denote the contribution rate to unemployment insurance, the union objective reads:
Ω = log[(1 − τ)wL − b] + logL. (2)- Native Welfare Losses from High Skilled Immigration - 3
Once the union has determined the low skilled wage, the ﬁrm hires both types of
labor according to the respective marginal productivity conditions:
∂Y
∂H
= A[α(NH + MH)
ρ + (1 − α)L
ρ]
1
ρ−1 α(NH + MH)
ρ−1 = wH, (3)
∂Y
∂L
= A[α(NH + MH)
ρ + (1 − α)L
ρ]
1
ρ−1 (1 − α)L
ρ−1 = wL, (4)
where both L and wH adjust for equilibrium, the high skilled wage warranting
H = NH + MH. It is straightforward to show that both L and wH decrease in the
low skilled wage.
Unions anticipate this behavior when setting wL. Hence, they maximize (2) subject
to (4) which leads to the ﬁrst-order condition:2
(1 − τ)







Considering the fact that aggregate low skilled labor demand cannot exceed aggre-
gate supply, (5) can be written as the aggregate wage setting equation:











αHρ + (1 − α)Lρ
(ρ − 1)αHρ (7)
is the (own) wage elasticity of low skilled labor demand. Due to the gross substi-
tutability property (ρ > 0), low skilled labor demand is always elastic (ε < −1), but





α(1 − ρ)Hρ−1 > 0. (8)
Equation (6) has the well known interpretation that the low skilled net wage is a
markup ε/((1−τ)(1+ε)) on the unemployment beneﬁt, the income in the reference
situation. As a higher labor demand elasticity implies higher employment losses
from a given wage increase, the markup - and hence the gross wage - is inversely
related to ε.
2 Simple, but tedious algebra shows that the second-order condition is fulﬁlled.- Native Welfare Losses from High Skilled Immigration - 4
Accordingly, both an increase of the unemployment beneﬁt and the tax rate reduce


























While the unemployment beneﬁt is exogenous from the perspective of the small
unions, it has to be funded in the aggregate. This is accomplished by taxing low
and high skilled earnings at rates τ ∈ [0,1) and δτ,δ ∈ [0,1/τ), respectively. Thus,
the welfare state is actuarial unfair if δ > 0 for in that case the high skilled pay
contributions to a scheme from which they never receive any beneﬁts.
Utilizing (3), the unemployment insurance budget constraint b(NL − L) = τwLL +
δτwHH can be written as a budget balance equation:












The unemployment beneﬁt equals the contributions by the low skilled workers per
unemployed, augmented by the income share of the high skilled as far as is ﬁscally
relevant (δ > 0).
The reaction of the unemployment beneﬁt on a rise in low skilled employment for a
given contribution/tax rate τ:
∂b
∂L


















L(δαHρ + (1 − α)Lρ)
(11)
results from the interplay of a number of eﬀects. The ﬁrst term in (11) reﬂects
the fact that each low skilled leaving unemployment allows the existing welfare
state revenue to be spread among less recipients. Ceteris paribus, this increases
the beneﬁt per unemployed. The second term measures the eﬀect of this additional
worker on total low skilled contributions. This eﬀect is also positive because labor
demand is elastic (ε < −1). But third, the income share of the high skilled decreases










< 0. (12)- Native Welfare Losses from High Skilled Immigration - 5
This has negative repercussions for welfare state revenues to the extent that the
high skilled contribute. As a consequence, the eﬀect of a marginal rise in low skilled
employment on the unemployment beneﬁt can not be unambiguously signed. Never-
theless, the beneﬁt becomes inﬁnitely high as the economy approaches full low skilled
employment as the number of recipients boils down to zero. Hence, a suﬃciently
large employment increase must increase b.
We are now in the position to derive the labor market equilibrium which is charac-
terized by the mutual compatibility of (6) and (10).
Proposition 1. For every τ ∈ [0,1), there exists at least one labor market
equilibrium. There is low skilled unemployment in equilibrium whenever τ > 0.
Proof. follows from the fact that WS is a continuous function in (L,b)-space,
with L = NL for b < max[b∗,0] where b∗ denotes the beneﬁt level for which wL =
w∗
L according to WS. For b ≥ max[b∗,0], L decreases continuously in b, see (9),
with limb→∞ L = 0. For τ = 0, BB coincides with the L-axis, hence equilibrium
employment amounts to NL. For τ > 0, BB is continuous in (L,b)-space, with
b = δτα1/ρ
NL for L = 0 whereas limL→NL b = ∞. Hence, BB must cut WS at least once
from below in (L,b)-space and all intersections must feature L < NL. 
Hence, the welfare state scheme is ultimately responsible for equilibrium unem-
ployment. Without any social protection, full employment would arise because the
union objective would be equivalent to the low skilled wage bill. Labor demand
being elastic everywhere, the wage bill increases monotonously in the low skilled
employment level and would consequently be maximized by the full employment
wage. But whenever the tax rate is positive, some low skilled must be jobless in
any equilibrium. This holds because full employment would imply an inﬁnitely high
beneﬁt. This in turn would induce unions to set an inﬁnitely high wage. Thus, full
employment can never constitute an equilibrium.
Due to the properties of the government budget constraint, multiple equilibria can
not be ruled out. However, the argumentation in the above proof reveals that there
must be at least one equilibrium where BB intersects WS from below in (L,b)-
space. Analytically speaking, the determinant of the system is negative for that













































In what follows, we conﬁne our attention to an equilibrium of this type and omit the
case |D| > 0. This can be justiﬁed by two reasons. First, existence of equilibrium
is ensured for (13) but not for the opposite case. Second, a negative determinant
leads to conventional economic eﬀects in the absence of immigration whereas a
positive determinant does not. To illustrate, consider a decrease of actuarial fairness
(δ ↑), boosting welfare state revenues for given employment levels. According to the
intuition behind (6), low skilled employment should decline because unions charge
higher wages as the reference situation improves ceteris paribus. However, this









∂b | {z }
(>0)
∂BB
∂δ | {z }
(<0)
i
Q 0 ⇐⇒ |D| Q 0.
Hence, by restricting the consideration to an equilibrium with a negative determi-
nant, the upcoming results are derived in a setup which delivers economic main-
stream results in other dimensions.
III. The Eﬀects of Immigration
This section addresses the consequences of high skilled immigration for employment
and the total income of natives.
Proposition 2. High skilled immigration reduces low skilled employment.



























.- Native Welfare Losses from High Skilled Immigration - 7
The economic mechanisms behind this result are simple. First, the stronger pres-
ence of the high skilled makes low skilled labor demand less elastic. This increases
the markup for a given beneﬁt, hence unions demand higher wages and low skilled
employment declines. Second, a higher population share of the high skilled increases
their contribution relative to the low skilled: (
∂(wHH)/(wLL)
∂H > 0 , the inverse to (12).
Whenever δ > 0, this brings about higher ﬁscal redistribution via unemployment in-
surance. The concomitant increase in the unemployment beneﬁt generates a further
increase in wage demands. Hence both eﬀects work in the same direction.
This employment contraction is contentious for the immigration surplus (Borjas,
1999), measured by the change in aggregate income of natives. The total income of
natives for given MH amounts to:
TNI = (1 − δτ)wHNH + (1 − τ)wLNL + (NL − L)b
= wHNH + wLL + δτwHMH, (14)
the sum of native gross earnings plus immigrants’ net ﬁscal contribution.
Proposition 3. Whenever the welfare state is not too actuarially unfair, marginal
immigration decreases total native income.















MH + δτwH. (15)










which is unambiguously negative for δ = 0. 
There are two eﬀects of marginal immigration on aggregate native income. First,
there is a negative output eﬀect, as the immigrant receives wH, which is more than
he adds to total production (∂Y/∂H+wLdL/dMH = wH+wLdL/dMH). Second, he
is a net ﬁscal contributor to an actuarially unfair welfare state. However, this eﬀect
vanishes when δ = 0; so the overall impact is negative whenever ﬁscal redistribution
is not too intense, that is δ is low.- Native Welfare Losses from High Skilled Immigration - 8
We have thus identiﬁed a situation where high skilled immigration decreases total
native income although wages are ﬂexible and the welfare state is outright redis-
tributive. This result diﬀers substantially from a full employment setting. There,
marginal immigration would be unambiguously beneﬁcial whenever δ > 0, as dL
dMH
equals zero for L = NL.
IV. Conclusion
This contribution puts some caution on the conventional wisdom that high skilled
immigration is unambiguously beneﬁcial for the receiving country. We have pre-
sented circumstances under which low skilled labor market distortions render high
skilled immigration a burden for the employment of less qualiﬁed individuals. This
negative eﬀect can translate into a negative immigration surplus.3 But even if the
surplus was positive, it would not be because but rather despite the native employ-
ment consequences. Therefore, some scepticism about the popular belief of positive
spillovers of high skilled immigrants on low skilled employment seems appropriate.
By changing the perspective to sending countries, our result provides another source
for positive eﬀects of a brain drain, complementary to studies emphasizing positive
eﬀects on skill formation (Mountford, 1997). In our model, high skilled emigration
would have a positive aggregate eﬀect on the source country provided its welfare
state has little redistribution. However, acknowledging that migration is driven by
redistribution diﬀerentials, the consequences of high skilled mobility become much
less clear-cut. It is easy to devise of a situation where the migration of high skilled
from a high to a lox tax country hurts both the home country because of the loss in
ﬁscal contributions, and the receiving country because of higher low skilled unem-
ployment.
3 Note that our result does not mean that increasing the number of high skilled natives would
have adverse eﬀects on the natives as a whole, as the income gain of the educated would be
included in our welfare measure (14).- Native Welfare Losses from High Skilled Immigration - 9
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